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J uvenile (In)J ustice: How J uvenile Pr etr ial
Detention in Mar yland Violates the J uvenile
Causes Act & Supr eme Cour t J ur ispr udence
By Sarah McHenry
ABSTRACT
Maryland’s Juvenile Causes Act states that children alleged delinquent
should only be removed from the home as a last resort and subsequently
provided a safe, humane, and caring environment while in the custody in
the state. However, children in Maryland are regularly detained prior to
adjudication, and many for non-violent offenses, such as technical
violations. These children are detained in pretrial detention centers, where
safety concerns and abuse allegations are reported regularly.
This comment will argue that Maryland is violating its juvenile statutes &
case law by detaining children prior to adjudication in its pretrial detention
centers. The statutory role of Juvenile Services, if the juvenile is in State
custody, is to provide for “safe, humane, and caring environment[s]” and to
secure for the child “custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents” only if it is
necessary to remove a child at all from the home.1 Maryland instead
unnecessarily detains juveniles prior to adjudication: first, at rates higher
than necessary; second, for offenses that should not be weighed in the
public interest (such as technical violations); third, in conditions that do not

1

See MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017).
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satisfy the “safe, humane, and caring environment” requirement of the
statute.2
The comment discusses Maryland’s Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Article, §3-8A-02, along with the case law that explains it. The comment
argues that Maryland is violating its code and case law by unnecessarily
detaining children in placements that are

fundamentally unsafe,

dehumanizing, and ineffective. It explains how the Supreme Court has
differentiated between adults and children in recent cases (ranging from
Roper v. Simmons to Montgomery v. Louisiana) and then provides empirical
evidence from scientific studies in order to lay the foundation that children
are extraordinarily different from adults in that they are more susceptible to
the psychological trauma of incarceration. The comment concludes by
recommending that alternatives to detention, such as community-based
treatment and therapeutic foster care, are in the best interest of the child, the
community, and the state for therapeutic, safety, and financial reasons.

I. INTRODUCTION
Until the day of the school fight in the spring of 2013, Tanika had been a
perfect student.3 Though no one was injured in the skirmish between her
and another girl, the state of Maryland nonetheless decided to charge her
with second-degree assault.4 Tanika had been an honors student and did not
have a history of delinquent behavior, and therefore, the Department of
Juvenile Services recommended the case be dismissed.5 The prosecutor,

2

See id.
See Erica Goode, Judge in Maryland Locks Up Youths and Rules Their Lives, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/us/judge-in-marylandlocks-up-youths-and-rules-their-lives.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QY99-VUD8].
4
See id. (noting that there were no injuries to any parties during the fight, although
there was property damage); see also MD. CODE CRIM. LAW §§ 3-201, 3-203 (2017)
(defining the crime of second-degree assault in Maryland).
5
See id. (noting that the Maryland Department of Juvenile Service has the option to
recommend dismissal of a charge or can informally adjust the matter of a juvenile).
3
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however, went forward with the charge.6 When Tanika missed her court
date, the presiding judge issued a writ to detain her in a secure facility
pending adjudication.7
Tanika spent an entire month detained in Thomas J. Waxter Children’s
Center (Waxter), a maximum-security detention center for girls in Laurel,
Maryland.8 The judge sent her there despite her outstanding grades, her
close relationship with her mother, and her otherwise spotless discipline
record.9 At Waxter, Tanika lived in a traumatizing environment with girls
who had significantly more severe behavioral and mental health needs.10
Tanika was miserable and frequently broke down crying.11 When Tanika
finally returned to the court and pled guilty to her charge, Judge Walton
ruled that she was delinquent and needed services from the court,
disregarding Tanika’s spotless history.12

6
See id.; see also MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-10(h) (2017) (recognizing that
a State’s Attorney can pursue a matter if any party appeals, including the victim, the
person who filed the complaint, and the arresting police officer).
7
See Goode, supra note 3 (highlighting presiding judge’s power over Tanika’s case).
8
See Goode, supra note 3 (reporting that Tanika was sent to Laurel for pretrial
detention); Tamieka Briscoe, Rise in Suicidal Behavior at Waxter Girls’ Detention
Center, CAP. NEWS SERV., PHILIP MERRILL C. JOURNALISM (Apr. 18, 2014),
http://cnsmaryland.org/2014/04/18/rise-in-suicidal-behavior-at-waxter-girls-detentioncenter/ (stating that Waxter Children’s Center is a female juvenile detention facility in
Laurel) [https://perma.cc/2XNY-TC87].
9
See Goode, supra note 3 (noting the mitigating factors that Judge Walton had
available when ruling to detain Tamika).
10
See Briscoe, supra note 8 (reporting on the rise in suicidal behavior at Waxter
Children’s Center and prevalence of trauma in detained juveniles); Scott McFarlane,
Dozens of Girls in Maryland Juvenile Detention Centers Are Victims of Sex Trafficking,
NBC NEWS 4 WASH. (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/Dozens-of-Girls-in-Maryland-JuvenileDetention-Centers-Are-Victims-of-Sex-Trafficking-274832081.html (reporting on the
rise of sex trafficking reports at Waxter Children’s Center) [https://perma.cc/8XAKBDL4].
11
See Goode, supra note 3 (describing Tanika’s volatile emotional state during
detention).
12
See id.; see also MD. RULE 11-112(a) (permitting pretrial detention of juveniles).
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The Maryland Juvenile Causes Act emphasizes the interest of the State in
the maintenance and strengthening of the family unit.13 While the Act gives
judges the power to remove a child from their home, it specifies that
removing a child is only to be done when necessary for the welfare of the
child or the good of public safety.14 If detention is absolutely necessary, the
State has an obligation under the Act to provide a comfortable and safe
environment for the youth.15 In the case of Tanika, as well as many other
youths, the State of Maryland grossly violates these statutory obligations,
resulting in a generation of traumatized children who are more likely to
have mental health issues and become involved in the adult criminal justice
system.16
This Comment argues that Maryland courts violate the purposes of the
Juvenile Causes Act by excessively and inappropriately detaining children
before trial in unsafe detention centers.17 Part II discusses the development
of Supreme Court juvenile precedent and explains the Maryland Juvenile
Causes Act.18 Part III argues that Maryland courts violate the Act’s
13
See id.; see also § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (stressing that conserving a child’s ties to his family
should be the priority of the System).
14
See MD. RULE 11-112(a) (authorizing judges or intake officers to detain a child if it is
in the best interest of the child or the community); see also MD. CODE § 3-8A-02(a)(5)
(2017); see also MD. CODE § 3-8A-15(b) (granting judges, magistrates, and intake
officers the power to detain a child prior to a hearing if the child is likely to leave the
jurisdiction).
15
See MD. CODE § 3-8A-02(a)(6)-(7) (mandating the Department of Juvenile Services to
provide a safe, caring, and humane environment to children in custody, along with access
to required services and care as close as possible to what should have been provided by
his parents).
16
See Patrick McCarthy et al., The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based
Alternative to the Youth Prison Model, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Oct. 2016)
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/ocpa/cms/files/criminal-justice/researchpublications/ntcc_the_future_of_youth_justice.pdf (providing a meta-analysis of studies
that conclude juvenile detention and commitment increase the risk of lower educational
attainment, mental illness, and criminal behavior) [https://perma.cc/N6A7-PP8R].
17
See MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01 (2017).
18
See infra Part II (discussing the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act, Maryland statutory
interpretation, and Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to
juveniles).
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unambiguous purpose clause sections pertaining to children alleged
delinquent by unnecessarily detaining them in violent detention centers.19
Part III additionally argues that even if the Juvenile Causes Act is
ambiguous, recent Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence mandates a stricter
standard for pretrial detention.20
This Comment recommends in Part V that the state of Maryland
drastically reduce all pretrial detention of juveniles and instead invest in
community-based interventions to serve youth awaiting adjudication.21
Finally, this Comment concludes that Maryland’s current practice of
inappropriately detaining children prior to adjudication violates the Juvenile
Causes Act and is contrary to Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence.22

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Maryland Juvenile Causes Act
Until the turn of the twentieth century, Maryland, along with the vast
majority of the country, prosecuted children over the age of seven in the
adult court system.23 This “barbaric” penal system resulted in cases such as
State v. Guild, where the court imposed the death penalty on a twelve-yearold child after finding that his uncorroborated confession was sufficient
evidence to convict him of murder.24
19

See infra Part III (explaining how juveniles alleged delinquent, as defined by the
Maryland law, are inappropriately detained in punitive facilities).
20
See infra Part III (arguing that the current pretrial detention practices of Maryland
violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
21
See infra Part IV (advancing the recommendations of best practices in juvenile justice
reform).
22
See infra Part V (arguing that Maryland’s current practice of unnecessarily detaining
youth prior to trial in unsafe detention violates the Juvenile Causes Act, as well as the
Eighth Amendment).
23
See In re Johnson, 255 A.2d 419, 422 (Md. 1969) (describing the background of the
Juvenile Causes Act, noting that children below the age of seven were considered
incapable of criminal intent).
24
See State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 189 (1828) (affirming the conviction and death
sentence of a twelve-year-old boy despite an uncorroborated confession, which would be
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In response to the growing public outrage over the inhumane treatment of
juveniles, Maryland established a separate jurisdiction for children alleged
delinquent under the age of sixteen in 1902.25 In 1969, the General
Assembly of Maryland passed a comprehensive set of laws, known today as
the Juvenile Causes Act, to further protect the rights of juveniles in court.26
The following year, in In re Hamill, the Court of Special Appeals
interpreted the Act, holding that the Legislature intended to preserve
juvenile court as a special, non-punitive type of proceeding that addresses
the unique needs of adolescents.27
Today, Maryland circuit courts may sit as juvenile courts and retain
exclusive jurisdiction over any child under the age of eighteen alleged to be
delinquent, with limited exceptions.28 The Juvenile Causes Act guides
Maryland courts, ensuring that the proceedings fall under the civil law,
rather than criminal law.29 The Act guarantees the preservation of the family

unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent today); see also In re Johnson, 255 A.2d
at 421; Abe Fortas, Equal Rights - For Whom? 42 N.Y.U. L.REV. 401, 405-06 (1967)
(describing the outcry against the prosecution of juvenile matters in adult courts)
[https://perma.cc/5E5A-RWGD].
25
See In re Johnson, 255 A.2d at 422 (noting that Maryland created a separate
jurisdiction for juveniles in 1902 as a result of public opinion and evolving standards of
decency).
26
See 1969 Md. Laws 82; see also In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1970) (noting that the Juvenile Laws were substantially revised in 1969 but retained the
same purposes).
27
See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d at 764 (interpreting the nature of the statute found in 1969
Md. Laws 82).
28
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03 (2017) (expanding the jurisdiction
of the court to all children under eighteen who are alleged delinquent, except children
over fourteen who are alleged to have committed a crime punishable by life
imprisonment and children over sixteen who are alleged to have committed a specified
set of crimes stated in § 3-8A-03(d)(4) or have violated the Transportation Article).
29
See In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90 (Md. 1994) (announcing that Maryland Courts
have consistently interpreted juvenile laws to reflect the special civil nature of juvenile
proceedings).
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unit except when the child’s welfare or public safety demands it.30 For
example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled in In re Julianna B.
that a judge may confine any juvenile who presents a “present threat” to
public safety.31 If a child is removed from the home, the Act demands a safe
and humane environment for children in state custody.32 In State v. Kanavy,
this provision was tragically tested when a child died while in Department
of Juvenile Services (DJS) custody.33 Finally, due to the 1997 amendments
to the Juvenile Causes Act, the court may now consider a variety of factors
during the disposition of a delinquent child, including public safety, the
accountability of the child to the community due to the delinquent act, and
the development of the child’s character.34
The purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act are varied and apply to different
actors in the system.35 For example, Maryland must provide the same level

30
See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d at 764; In re Appeal No. 179, 327 A.2d 793, 794 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (ruling that no juvenile may be separated from his family unless public
safety or his welfare demands it).
31
See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (insisting the lower
court abused its discretion for denying community visits to a juvenile who presented no
evidence of violent behavior; also noting that the juvenile was initially detained and
subsequently committed due to the severity of her second-degree murder charge)
(vacated on other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)).
32
See State v. Kanavy, 4 A.3d 991, 995 (Md. 2010) (reviewing the language of MD.
CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 in finding that DJS employees owed a duty of
medical care and provision of a safe and humane environment to the child who died in
their custody).
33
See id. at 996 (explaining that DJS employees were clearly subjected to the plain
language of § 3-8A-02 when a child died in DJS custody).
34
See In re Saifu K., 978 A.2d 881, 889 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (analyzing the 1997
amendments to the Juvenile Causes Act to reach the conclusion that the legislature sought
to change the purpose of juvenile justice law for delinquent youth to a system of
accountability); MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (stating that the
Juvenile Justice System must ensure the balance of certain objectives for children who
have committed delinquent acts).
35
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(1)-(2), 3-8A-02(a)(5), 3-8A02(a)(7) (2017) (specifying different responsibilities for various actors coming within the
provisions of the subtitle, including delinquent children, the Juvenile Justice System, and
parents of delinquent children).
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of care and services provided to children at home and in custody.36 A judge
or magistrate may only remove a child to state custody from the home if
necessary for his or her welfare or for public safety purposes.37 Overall, the
Act is “civil in nature” and not intended to be punitive.38
B. Maryland Statutory Interpretation
The canons of statutory construction are “well-settled” in Maryland.39
The trier of fact’s goal is to determine the intent of the General Assembly.40
The trier of fact focuses their inquiry on the plain words of the statute, being
careful not to add, delete, overemphasize, or underemphasize words or
phrases.41 For example, in Taylor v. NationsBank, the Court of Appeals
looked at a statutory definition according to the canons of statutory
construction when determining whether information disclosed orally was
considered “account information.”42 The Court looked at the plain language
of the statute to make its ruling. As the statute’s plain language did not
contain the word “oral,” it held that statute was not violated because the
definition made no reference to oral information and solely concerned
written records or copies.43

36

See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)-(7) (ensuring that the parental “custody, care, and discipline,”
as well as safe and humane care, will be provided to any child in State custody).
37
See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (stating that the principal purpose is to conserve and
strengthen the family unit, and to only separate it if absolutely necessary).
38
See In re Victor B., 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (Md. 1994) (holding that the Maryland
Courts have consistently interpreted the purpose of juvenile proceedings as “civil in
nature”).
39
Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (providing the background of
statutory interpretation in Maryland).
40
See id. (emphasizing that the ultimate objective for the canons of construction is to
discern a legislature’s intent).
41
See id. (explaining the steps of statutory interpretation).
42
See id. (reviewing §§ 1-302 and 1-301(b)(1) of the Financial Institutions Article in
their “plain terms”).
43
See id. at 656 (holding that because the respondent possessed no financial records as
defined by § 1-301(b)(1), he did not violate the statute).
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C. United States Supreme Court Juvenile Jurisprudence
Over the past twelve years, the United States Supreme Court has
increasingly recognized the special nature of children in the criminal justice
system.44 Beginning with Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the Supreme Court
struck down the death penalty for children and has since developed a
precedent that distinguishes children as radically different from adults.45
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the execution of any
person under the age of eighteen was unconstitutional under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.46 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied upon a consensus among states against the
practice and the diminished capacity of youth.47 The Court found a
consensus among states by first looking at the twenty states that permitted
capital punishment and how infrequently they issued a death sentence.48
The Court then found that the underdevelopment of a youth’s personality
and morals results in lessened culpability in the eyes of the law, as a youth’s
impulsive

destructive

premeditation.

act

stems

from

immaturity,

rather

than

49

The Supreme Court extended the holding of Roper in 2010 by ruling in
Graham v. Florida that mandatory life without parole sentences for
44

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that children are constitutionally different than
adults).
45
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding the death penalty for juveniles violates the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
46
See id. (holding the death penalty for juveniles violates Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution due to juveniles’ reduced capacity
of culpability).
47
See id. (noting that the irresponsibility of juveniles renders them unable to plan ahead,
understand the scope of their actions, or appreciate consequences before it is too late, and
therefore their actions are less morally reprehensible).
48
See id. at 565 (noting that even in the twenty jurisdictions that permitted the death
penalty for juveniles, only three had so done in the past ten years).
49
See id. (holding that the immaturity and lack of capacity for premeditation renders
youths to have a diminished capacity, and thus unable to receive capital punishment).
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juveniles who commit nonhomicidal offenses violated the Cruel & Unusual
Punishment Clause.50 The Court found a national consensus against the
sentencing practice.51 In thirty-seven jurisdictions where laws permitted
courts to sentence juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole, the
lower courts were not applying the sentences.52 Subsequently, the majority
looked to why the practice was cruel, finding most notably that children’s
brains are radically different than those of adults.53 As the brain continues to
grow throughout adolescence, children are more capable of change than
adults.54
After Graham, the Court applied its reasoning in Miller v. Alabama and
retroactively in Montgomery v. Louisiana, determining that juvenile life
sentences for homicide offenses were logically analogous to the death
penalty.55 The Court reemphasized that children could not be treated as
miniature versions of adults.56 The Court further developed the reasoning
from three precepts formed in Roper by using the support of advancements
in social and biological science.57 First, children have a severe lack of
maturity, which leads to an increased likelihood of recklessness and
50
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding mandatory life without parole
for juveniles who commit nonhomicidal offenses violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding the death
penalty for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause).
51
Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 61–62 (explaining which type of legal test to apply to
Graham).
52
See id. at 62 (finding that the actual sentencing of juveniles to life without parole was
so infrequent that it was indicative of a consensus against the practice).
53
See id. at 68 (discussing the recent developments in neuropsychology and social
science that distinguish children from adults).
54
See id. (determining that children are less likely to be incorrigible than adults due to
their increased capacity for change).
55
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (holding mandatory juvenile life
sentences unconstitutional); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016)
(holding that mandatory juvenile life sentences are unconstitutional retroactively).
56
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 (emphasizing that children are not miniature adults due to
their development and vulnerability).
57
See id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (2005)).
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impulsivity.58 Second, children are psychologically and socially more
vulnerable than adults.59 Finally, a child’s character and personality is
neither socially nor neurologically formed before the age of eighteen; it
continues to mature until he reaches adulthood.60 These developments in
neuroscience and psychology support the notion that children are
significantly less likely to become incorrigible and can benefit from
rehabilitation.61
The Court incorporated the reasoning of Roper-Graham-MillerMontgomery in the 2011 Fifth Amendment case of J.D.B. v. North
Carolina.62 The Court determined that any Miranda custody analysis must
include consideration of a suspect’s age.63 Justice Sotomayor, writing for
the Court, emphasized that police interrogations are particularly traumatic
for children.64 Compared to adult defendants, children are more
psychologically helpless, more likely to falsely confess, more likely to be
manipulated by adults, and less likely to understand the process of an
interrogation.65 The Court again stressed that children are not to be treated
like miniature adults at any stage of the criminal process because of their
vulnerability and lack of maturity.66

58

See id. (noting that the immaturity of juveniles leads to impulsive decision-making and
reckless actions).
59
See id. at 470 (noting the children’s increased vulnerability and differences in loci of
control between children and adults, due to institutional limits on children).
60
See id. (comparing the neuroplasticity between youths and adults).
61
See id. at 476.
62
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (noting that the Court has
already observed in Roper, Miller, and Graham that children are more susceptible to
outside pressures than adults).
63
See id. at 264 (holding that because interrogations are inherently coercive, the Miranda
custody analysis should include consideration of a suspect’s age).
64
See id. at 269 (citing amici curiae briefs that highlight the exceptional rate of false
confessions from youth).
65
See id. at 269–72 (explaining the multiple disadvantages of youth while in custody due
to their misplaced trust in police and lack of experience, perspective, and judgment).
66
See id. at 272.
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The Court has not always set such progressive precedent for children’s
rights, however.67 Schall v. Martin, in 1984, upheld a New York statute that
authorized juvenile pretrial detention against claims that it violated due
process.68 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, opined that New York
State’s legitimate interest in protecting the community from juvenile crime
outweighed a juvenile’s interest in freedom.69 The Court determined that the
New York statute did not amount to punishment because it included
provisions such as expedited hearings and suitable conditions of
confinement.70 The legitimacy of the New York statute was additionally
supported by the prevalence of similar statutes in every state and the
District of Columbia, including a comparable statute found in the Maryland
Annotated Code today.71

67
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256–57 (1984) (upholding a New York State
statute against a due process challenge, authorizing pretrial detention for juveniles).
68
See id. (determining the New York statute served a legitimate state regulatory
objective by protecting public safety and the juveniles themselves without serving as a
punishment).
69
See id. at 265 (recognizing that a juvenile is always in custody, whether in that of his
parents or of the state, because children are assumed to not be able to take care of
themselves).
70
See id. at 269 (noting the expedited procedural protections afforded to youths detained
under the New York statute).
71
See id. at 267 (giving weight to the fact that the practice was followed by a large
number of jurisdictions because it helps to determine whether a practice offends key
principal of justice) (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)) (internal
quotations omitted); MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (2017) (authorizing a
judge or intake officer to take a child into custody prior to a hearing).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Through the Unnecessary Use of Pretrial Detention in Unsafe Facilities,
the Maryland Courts Violate the Stated Purposes of Juvenile Causes Act
1. Mar yland Unnecessar ily Uses Pr etr ial Detention in Violation of the
J uvenile Causes Act
The Purposes clause of the Juvenile Causes Act directs a magistrate or
judge to remove a child from the home only when necessary.72 While a trier
of law may commit a delinquent child to the custody of the State based on a
finding of delinquency, the same Purpose clause subtitles do not apply to a
child alleged delinquent. However, Maryland unnecessarily detains children
alleged delinquent in violation of the Act by removing them when it is
neither for their welfare nor in the interest of public safety.73
An analysis of the text of the Juvenile Causes Act demonstrates that the
Act makes several distinctions between key actors in the Juvenile Justice
System.74 The Act distinguishes a delinquent child from a child alleged as
delinquent.75 A delinquent child, according to the Act, is one who the court
has found involved in a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or
rehabilitation.76 Guidance, treatment, and rehabilitation for a delinquent
72

See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(6) (2017) (stating that a child should be
separated from his or her home only if necessary).
73
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, DOORS TO DJS COMMITMENT: WHAT DRIVES
JUVENILE CONFINEMENT IN MARYLAND? 4 (2015),
http://djs.maryland.gov/Documents/publications/AECF%20Assessment%20of%20MD%
20Dispositions%20-%20Updated%20March%2016%20-%20Final%20PDF.pdf
(describing how Maryland courts unnecessarily detain children prior to trial through
technical violations) [https://perma.cc/M7PA-K5DN].
74
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)-(7) (2017) (differentiating purpose
clauses based on the actor, such as the responsibilities of a parent of a delinquent child in
§ 3-8A-02(a)(3), contrasted with the State’s obligation to a delinquent child in § 3-8A02(a)(1)).
75
See id. § 3-8A-01(m) (providing the statutory definition of delinquent).
76
Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(m), and 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(3)
(providing the statutory definition of delinquent and the statutory obligations for
delinquent children), with §§ 3-8A-02 (a)(4)–(7) (mentioning only “children” and
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child comes in the form of services from the court and DJS, which may
involve commitment to a facility, drug treatment, or therapy, depending on
the child’s needs.77 A child alleged delinquent is one who has received a
citation for a violation of the Criminal or Education Laws, but the court has
not yet found that the child was involved in the delinquent act or needs
guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.78
The higher courts of Maryland have appropriately followed this
distinction between delinquent children and children alleged delinquent.79
Delinquent children are subjected to a variety of factors when the System
(referring to the juvenile justice system, including the court, the State’s
Attorney, DJS, and social services) is considering disposition, including
public safety of the community, the accountability of the child to the
community due to the delinquent act, and the development of the child’s
character.80 This statutory language, such as the state having the obligation
of maintaining “public safety and protection of the community” for
delinquent children, allows judges to commit delinquent children to long-

“children coming within the provisions of this subtitle”); see also In re George V., 589
A.2d 521, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (describing the bifurcated process in in
Maryland juvenile court of first determining involvement in the delinquent act, and then
whether the child needs services).
77
See In re Demetrius J., 583 A.2d 258, 259–60 (Md. 1991) (detailing the scope of
DJS’s responsibilities concerning placement and services).
78
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-13 (describing the petition process for a
child alleged delinquent); see also In re George V., 589 A.2d at 522 (describing the
bifurcated process in Maryland juvenile court of first determining involvement and then
whether the child is delinquent and needs services).
79
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(7) (2017) (differentiating
purpose clauses based on the actor, such as the responsibilities of a parent of a delinquent
child in § 3-8A-02(a)(3), contrasted with the State’s obligation to a delinquent child in §
3-8A-02(a)(1)).
80
See In re Saifu K., 978 A.2d at 889 (analyzing the 1997 amendments to the Juvenile
Causes Act to reach the conclusion that the legislature sought to change the purpose of
juvenile justice law for delinquent youth to a system of accountability); MD. CODE, CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (stating that the Juvenile Justice System must
ensure the balance of certain objectives for children who have committed delinquent
acts).
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term placement after a finding of delinquency and an assessment for
rehabilitation needs.81 Children alleged delinquent, however, have no such
obligations imposed by the Act; instead, children alleged delinquent
continue to be only subject to Purpose clause subtitles that do not apply to
delinquent children.82 Similar to the early statutory mandates of 1969, these
subtitles today include the state’s duty to preserve the family unit and
separate a child from his parents only if necessary for the child’s welfare or
in the interest of public safety.83
Some may argue that the Juvenile Causes Act has changed over its fiftyyear history; therefore, case law interpreting its earlier versions does not
apply today. When interpreting the language of a Maryland statute,
however, one must use the “well-settled” canons of statutory construction.84
The trier of law must discern the intent of the Legislature by looking at the
plain language of the statute, being careful not to add, delete,
overemphasize, or underemphasize words or phrases.85 If a statute uses two
different terms or omits a term, it signifies that those terms are to be treated
differently.86 For example, in Taylor v. NationsBank, the Court of Appeals
81

See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(7) (2017); In re George V., 589
A.2d 521, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (describing the bifurcated process by which a
judge or magistrate first determines whether a juvenile was involved in a delinquent act,
and then whether he is in need of services).
82
Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mentioning
only “children” and “children coming within the provisions of this subtitle,”) with §§ 38A-02(a)(1)–(3) (specifying “children who have committed delinquent acts” and
“children found to be delinquent”).
83
See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6) (placing the emphasis on the strengthening of the family unit
and forbidding the removal of a child from his home unless in his welfare or in the
interest of public safety).
84
See Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (providing the background
of statutory interpretation in Maryland); see also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
Chase, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000) (establishing the tradition of statutory interpretation in
Maryland).
85
See Taylor, 776 A.2d at 654 (explaining the steps of statutory interpretation).
86
See id. (explaining that the trier of law should not attempt to give the text a forced
meaning or attempt to add or delete words in the text, as the trier of law should take the
statute at plain meaning).
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interpreted a section of the Financial Institutions Code of Maryland.87 In
determining whether information disclosed orally was considered “account
information,” the Court examined the statutory definition according to the
canons of statutory construction.88 As the definition made no reference to
oral information and solely concerned written records or copies, the Court
held that the statute was not violated.89
Applying this same logic to the Juvenile Causes Act, children alleged
delinquent are not subject to the Purpose clause of the Act that apply to
delinquent children because they do not meet, and have never met, the
statutory definition.90 For example, the young woman we encountered in
this Comment’s Introduction, Tanika, was only a child alleged delinquent
when she was first detained at Waxter Children’s Center.91 She had only
missed her status date, for which she was detained for a month in a
traumatizing jail, isolated from her friends and family.92
The Juvenile Causes Act directs the Juvenile Justice System to refrain
from removing a child from the home unless it may be in the interest of
public safety.93 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled in In re
Julianna B. that a judge may confine any juvenile who presents a “present

87

See id. at 655–56 (determining whether the respondent acted in violation of § 1-302 of
the Financial Institutions Article when he disclosed information via telephone).
88
See id. at 655. (reviewing §§ 1-302 and 1-301(b)(1) of the Financial Institutions
Article in their “plain terms”).
89
See Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (holding that because the
respondent possessed no financial records as defined by § 1-301(b)(1), he did not violate
the statute).
90
Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mentioning
only “children” and “children coming within the provisions of this subtitle,”) with §§ 38A-02(a)(1)–(3) (2017) (specifying “children who have committed delinquent acts” and
“children found to be delinquent”).
91
See Goode, supra note 3 (reporting that Tanika was sent to Laurel for pretrial
detention after missing her court date).
92
See id.
93
See id. § 3-8A-02 (allowing authorities of the system to remove a child only if it is in
the best interest of the child or the community).
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threat” to public safety.94 However, Maryland admits that juvenile
confinement is not reserved for youth who pose a risk to the public.95
Rather, a technical violation of probation or court rules, such as misuse of
an electronic monitoring bracelet, is the most likely reason for a judge to
confine a youth.96 Again, the young woman we encountered in this
Comment’s Introduction, Tanika, was unnecessarily detained prior to trial
due to a technical violation.97 Tanika’s charged offense was a minor school
fight, so inconsequential that the intake officer had initially wanted to
dismiss it.98 However, the judge detained Tanika when she missed her court
date.99 Missing a court date is violating a court order, which in Maryland
may be grounds for detention.100 At the time, Tanika was a youth alleged
delinquent, which means the judge could not apply the Purpose subtitles
relevant to delinquent youth in order to justify her detention.101 While
Tanika was detained at Waxter Children’s Center, she suffered extreme
emotional distress.102 She found the separation from her mother intolerable,

94
See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (insisting the lower
court abused its discretion for denying community visits to a juvenile who presented no
evidence of violent behavior) (vacated on other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)).
95
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 4.
96
See id. (unraveling the most common reasons behind juvenile confinement in
Maryland).
97
See Goode, supra note 3 (observing that the judge detained Tanika for missing her
court date).
98
See id. (stating that DJS originally refused to pursue the complaint because no one was
injured in the fight and Tanika did not have any prior involvement with the juvenile
justice system).
99
See id. (noting that the judge has the power under Maryland to detain a child if he
poses a flight risk).
100
See In re Ann M., 525 A.2d 1054, 1058 (Md. 1987) (explaining that various Maryland
and state courts have used the contempt power when a juvenile disobeys juvenile court
orders).
101
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-01(m), 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (providing
the statutory definition of delinquent and the Purpose clause sections relevant to
delinquent children).
102
See Goode, supra note 3 (describing Tanika’s emotional state while detained,
particularly due to the separation from her mother).
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and the effects of her detention continue to taint her formerly spotless life as
an Honor Student.103
The mental health of youth removed from home is a pressing concern of
child advocates. A DJS intake officer, magistrate, or judge has the authority
to remove a child from the home for the child’s welfare.104 In determining
whether to detain an alleged delinquent child, a magistrate weighs a number
of factors concerning the child’s welfare, including the mental health of the
child and the child’s compliance in taking medication.105 The Department of
Juvenile Services estimates that 75 percent of girls and 57 percent of boys
in detention centers have moderate to severe mental health needs.106
However, most of the detention centers do not have adequate mental health
services.107 Therefore, removing a child with mental health needs is not
necessary for the welfare of a child, and in fact usually adversely affects a
child’s mental health.108
The standard for the removal of a child has always been stringent.109 The
earliest version of the Juvenile Causes Act forbade the System from
103
See id. (detailing the negative impacts of detention on Tanika’s life, including
emotional trauma, limited social interactions, and no opportunity to participate in her
spiritual life).
104
See MD. CT. RULE 11-112(a) (giving authorization to any judge or intake officer to
remove a child from the home if it is in the best interest of the child or the community);
MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (authorizing a judge or intake officer to take a
child into custody prior to a hearing).
105
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (2017).
106
See NICK MORONEY ET AL., MARYLAND JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT, 2016
SECOND QUARTER REPORT 34 (2016),
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/JJM%20Documents/16_Quarter2.pdf
[hereinafter SECOND QUARTER REPORT] (estimating the mental health needs of juveniles
in out-of-home placements) [https://perma.cc/N6A7-PP8R].
107
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 36 (explaining that children’s
mental health needs are best served in the community, rather than an institution).
108
See PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–6 (describing how social
scientists have linked institutional environments with more severe mental illness, lower
employment outcomes, and higher recidivism).
109
See, e.g., In re Joseph G., 617 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); In re
Jertrude O., 466 A.2d 885, 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (emphasizing that the removal
of a child from the home is “drastic”).
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separating youth from families unless necessary for the youth’s well-being
or in the interests of public safety.110 The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals interpreted the statute the following year in In re Hamill.111 Based
on the plain language of the statute, the Court held that Legislature intended
to maintain the delicate, non-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings in
order to address the unique needs of adolescents, including disposing of
cases in the interest of the child’s protection or rehabilitation, rather than
punishment.112 Therefore, the court held that a child should be in a healthy
family environment whenever possible, and that an institution is an
improper venue for a child, whether delinquent or not, to receive
rehabilitation unless absolutely necessary.113 Moreover, the alcoholism or
drug addiction of a parent does not necessitate the removal of a child from
his home, nor does suspected child abuse.114 However, if a child is using
drugs and habitually running away, and the parents cannot or will not
provide custody, the court may deem the detention of a child necessary to

110

See 1969 Md. Laws 82 (stating a primary purpose of the Act was to separate a child
from his parents “only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public
safety”).
111
See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (interpreting the
nature of the statute found in 1969 Md. Laws 82).
112
See id. (noting that “the purposes of the Act were plainly outlined” because the text
stated that the act “‘ provide[s] for the care, protection and wholesome mental and
physical development of children . . .’” (quoting 1969 Md. Laws 82)) (emphasis added).
113
See id. (explaining the Legislature’s preference for parent custody over institutional
custody).
114
See In re Joseph G., 617 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (stating that
depriving a child of his parents is “drastic,” and may not be based on suspected
allegations, even if the allegations are child abuse); In re William B., 533 A.2d 16, 19
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (finding that substance abuse on its face is not sufficient
grounds for the removal of a child from his home because the State may only do so if the
parents are unwilling to provide him ordinary care and attention).
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protect the child’s welfare.115 An extremely severe crime, such as murder,
may necessitate the detention of a child in order to protect the public.116
2. Mar yland Detains Youth in Unsafe and Inhumane Detention Center s
in Violation of the J uvenile Causes Act
If a judge determines that pretrial detention is indeed necessary for a
youth alleged delinquent, the Juvenile Causes Act and Maryland common
law require the state to provide a safe and humane environment with access
to necessary services.117 The state of Maryland violates this provision by
detaining children prior to trial in unsafe facilities that are ill-suited to their
needs.118
The

environment

in

Maryland’s

inappropriately punitive and unsafe.

119

juvenile

detention

centers

is

Regardless of whether a child has

been detained for their protection or on behalf of public safety, the state has
only maximum-security (or “hardware-secure”) detention centers for his or
her detention.120 These maximum security detention centers support
115

See In re Caitlin N., 994 A.2d 454, 458 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (not contesting the
trial court’s finding that emergency detention was necessary when the respondent was
using drugs and her mother was unable to provide supervision at home).
116
See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (noting that the
respondent had been detained prior to trial on second-degree murder charges) (vacated on
other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)).
117
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(7) (2017) (mandating the provision of a
“safe, humane, and caring environment” and access to required services for detained
children); Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809, 814 (Md. 1990) (adopting Supreme Court
precedent granting to persons in State custody safe conditions of confinement, freedom
from unnecessary bodily restraints, and at least minimal training of staff).
118
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–43 (reporting the high levels of
violence and abuse in Maryland’s juvenile detention centers).
119
See id. (noting the inappropriate use of physical restraints and isolation; the high levels
of violence; and the high levels of mental health needs at Maryland juvenile detention
facilities).
120
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 271 (1984) (differentiating between the conditions
in minimum-security and maximum-security detention centers for juveniles); SECOND
QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–43 (detailing the available detention facilities
for children, including Lower Eastern Shore Children’s Center, Western Maryland
Children’s Center, Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Center, Thomas Waxter Children’s
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punitive policies such as strip-searching children, isolation, and shackling
certain children when they move in between units.121 These detention
centers are not substitutions for parental custody; rather, they are hotbeds of
violence and suicidality.122 Frightening levels of violence exist at detention
facilities, such as the Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center (BCJJC) and
Cheltenham Youth Facility, with as many as sixty-four assaults occurring in
one quarter, or one roughly every three days.123 With ninety uses of physical
restraint in the same quarter, the staff of BCJJC is not providing the
“custody, care, and discipline” that should be provided to youth in DJS
custody.124 According to the statute, the discipline provided should be that
of a reasonable parent.125 A reasonable parent’s discipline, under Maryland
law, does not include excessive physical abuse or exposure to a violent and
chaotic environment.126 Moreover, Maryland common law guarantees to

Center, Charles H. Hickey School, Cheltenham Youth Facility, and Baltimore Juvenile
Justice Center. Note: Liberty House Shelter is a minimum-security shelter care facility,
but only has 10 beds and is only available to Baltimore youth).
121
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 19, 22 (noting the inappropriate
usage of seclusion and shackling); Erica L. Green, Juveniles in Maryland’s Justice
System Are Routinely Strip-Searched and Shackled, BALTIMORE SUN (March 13, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-strip-and-shackle20160129-story.html (detailing the excessive use of strip-searching and shackling for
youth in DJS custody) [https://perma.cc/3AZ4-GU46].
122
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1 (noting the prevalence of suicidal
ideation at DJS-operated facilities during the quarter).
123
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 18 (reporting the number of youth
on youth assaults or fights from April 1 to June 30, or 91 days).
124
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC § 3-8A-02(a)(6) (2016).
125
See id.; see also In re Christiana G., 530 A.2d 771, 774 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(holding that the parent’s discipline was unreasonable and constituted physical abuse,
therefore in part justifying the removal of the child from the home).
126
See In re Christiana G., 530 A.2d at 774 (finding that the chaotic environment of the
home, including physical abuse, posed a risk to the child’s well-being and thus justified
the drastic step of removing the child from the home).
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individuals in state custody the right to be free from unreasonable bodily
restraints.127
Many Maryland juvenile detention centers are also chronically
understaffed and overwhelmed by the needs of the population.128 A lack of
staffing in detention centers may result in drastic consequences for a
mentally ill child, whose mild agitation may escalate if a staff member is
not available to respond.129 Escalations of behavior may result in physical
altercations, seclusion, or shackling.130 When the custodians of a child in
custody do not provide proper care, death can occur.131 In State v. Kanavy, a
juvenile died while in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services at
the Bowling Brook juvenile facility.132 The Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled that the laws of Maryland impose a duty to provide the child with
medical care, as well as a safe, humane, and caring environment.133 The
Court found that the State could prove the employees knew of their duties to
the child and disregarded them, denying the child a safe, humane, and
caring environment.134 The Court, therefore, allowed for the grand jury to
indict the DJS employees on reckless endangerment charges.135
127
See Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809, 814 (Md. 1990) (adopting Supreme Court
precedent granting to persons in State mental hospitals, and thus state custody, safe
conditions of confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds).
128
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 30 (describing the effect of staffing
shortages on the operations of the facilities, including shortages of emergency mental
health treatment).
129
See id. (detailing incident 136578, where an agitated youth did not receive prompt
assistance and her behavior escalated into a physical altercation with a DJS staff
member).
130
See id. (describing the need for more influence from mental health staff to reduce the
incidences of shackling and seclusion).
131
See State v. Kanavy, 4 A.3d 991, 994 (Md. 2010) (describing the death of a juvenile in
a state facility due to the reckless endangerment of DJS staff).
132
See id. (voicing concern about the conduct of state employees and their duties to the
juveniles in their care).
133
See id. at 995 (stressing the duty that the plain language of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 imposes on the Department of Juvenile Services).
134
See id. at 998 (finding that reckless endangerment charges were appropriate, as the
State must prove the respondents owed a duty of care to the deceased; the respondents
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Although the Bowling Brook facility today is no longer in use, Maryland
continues to operate similar facilities.136 Several of these facilities have had
alarming issues with violence, including abuse of juveniles by staff.137
Though the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services is statutorily
obligated to provide the children in its custody with “access to required
services” and a “safe, humane, and caring environment,” it fails its duty and
endangers the lives of the children in its care.138
B. Even if the Juvenile Causes Act Was Ambiguous, United States Supreme
Court Jurisprudence Demonstrates That Maryland Should Drastically
Reduce the Use of Pretrial Detention
1. The Roper -Miller -Gr aham -J .D.B.-Montgomer y Canon Mandates
that Unnecessar y J uvenile Pr etr ial Detention is Pr ohibited by the
Eighth Amendment
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution guarantees to all individuals the right not to be
punished excessively for a transgression.139 In order to establish whether a
were aware of the duty; the omission of the duty of care created a substantial risk of
physical harm; under the circumstances, the respondents would not have disregarded the
duty of care; and the respondents consciously disregarded their duties).
135
See id. at 998 (vacating the previous order of the trial court and reinstating the
indictments so that the Department of Juvenile Services employees may be prosecuted on
charges of reckless endangerment).
136
See DJS Pulls Remaining Youths from Bowling Brook, MD. DEP’T JUV. SERV. (Mar. 2,
2007), http://www.djs.maryland.gov/Documents/press/pr030207.pdf (stating that
Bowling Brook was shut down after the death of the child in Kanavy)
[https://perma.cc/V59M-5F8A]; SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4–43
(noting that Bowling Brook is not a facility currently in use by the Department of
Juvenile Services; however, many of the detention and commitment centers have issues
with staffing, youth safety, and providing adequate psychiatric and medical care).
137
See id. at 34 (reporting incident 137417, where a child reported being choked by a
staff member and losing feeling in his chin after being in a physical restraint).
138
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)–(7) (2017) (providing the
statutory duty for the Department of Juvenile Services concerning children in its
custody).
139
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 569
(2005) (holding that the death penalty was an excessive punishment for a juvenile

VOLUME 16 • ISSUE 2 • 2017

370 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

practice violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, a court must
evaluate the jurisdictions’ evolving standards by analyzing the objective
indicia of a consensus against the practice, as well as whether the practice
serves legitimate penological goals.140
Based on the national and state consensus against pretrial detention and
its lack of penological goals, pretrial detention of juveniles in Maryland
violates the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.141 Contrary to assertions made thirty-three years ago in Schall
v. Martin, the national consensus now demonstrates that Maryland’s
practice of sending alleged delinquent juvenile to pretrial detention no
longer meets our standards of decency.142 A court’s inquiry into the nation’s
evolving standards of decency can incorporate legislation and state practice,
along with the court’s own judgment on the acceptability of the practice.143
Based on the declining rates of pretrial detention, there exists a consensus in
both Maryland and the United States in favor of ending confinement

because children have an underdeveloped sense of self, and thus their actions cannot be
as morally reprehensible).
140
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (describing how a court evaluates a practice to determine
whether there is a violation of the Eighth Amendment); see also Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (explaining that severe punishments that serve legitimate penological
goals may be upheld by courts).
141
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (forbidding the imposition of cruel or unusual
punishment); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 25; see also Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment into the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Thompson v. Grindle, 688 A.2d 466, 485 (1997)
(affirming that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is construed in pari
materia with Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights).
142
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 271, 278 (1984) (upholding the New York statute
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles in part because of the majority of states that
had a similar statute, in addition to the determination that it served a legitimate state
regulatory objective by protecting public safety and the juveniles themselves without
serving as a punishment); ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (detailing
the nationwide shift in juvenile detention policy from incarceration to community-based
services).
143
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
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practices.144 Moreover, the Supreme Court precedent of treating juveniles
less harshly further demonstrates that pretrial detention is not necessary.145
Therefore, the practice of pretrial detention in Maryland violates the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.146
The practices and policies of the United States and the Maryland
Attorney General reflect a general consensus that the practice of
unnecessary pretrial detention is cruel and costly.147 Despite the early-1990s
fear-mongering of the supposed juvenile “superpredator,” juvenile crime
nationwide has steeply declined over the past two decades.148 In response,
nearly every state has adopted policies to reduce the confinement of
juveniles, reflecting a nationwide agreement that juveniles are best served in
the community.149 Moreover, the Maryland Office of the Attorney General
has officially stated in multiple reports that the courts and the Department
of Juvenile Services should collaborate to lower the rate of pre-trial
144

See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (describing the national shift
in juvenile detention policy from incarceration to community-based services); see also
SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 2 (describing targeted efforts by DJS to
reduce intake referrals and thus reduce the number of detained and incarcerated children).
145
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.
261 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (stressing the differences in culpability and penological goals for
children and adults).
146
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 25.
147
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 36 (citing the research on juvenile
confinement of the Annie E. Casey Foundation in adopting the position that juvenile
detention and incarceration is extremely costly while providing no additional benefit for
public safety or outcomes for children); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, FACTSHEET: THE
TIP OF THE ICEBERG: WHAT TAXPAYERS PAY TO INCARCERATE YOUTH (2015)
(reporting the average of juvenile incarceration as $401 per day, per juvenile) (hereinafter
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2015) [https://perma.cc/W3AX-2K95].
148
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (reporting on the steep decline
nationwide in juvenile crime).
149
See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH
INCARCERATION, 5 (2014)
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/sticker_shock_final_v2.pd
f (highlighting the “juvenile deincarceration” trend that has steadily progressed since
2001, due to advances in research and policymaking) [hereinafter JUSTICE POLICY
INSTITUTE 2014].
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detention.150 The Office of the Attorney General has also implemented
additional “deincarceration” programs in recent years, such as the
nationally-known Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiatives of the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, which attempts to divert youth out of the juvenile justice
system during the early stages of delinquency proceedings.151
When evaluating whether a general consensus against a practice exists,
the U.S. Supreme Court looks at how often a practice is actually used.152 In
Graham, the Court examined the actual sentencing practices of the thirtyseven states that permitted life without parole sentences for nonhomicide
juvenile offenders.153 The Court found that because the sentences were
imposed so infrequently, this was indicative of a consensus against the use
of the practice.154 Applying the same logic, there exists a general consensus
against the widespread use of pretrial detention because many courts across
the nation have ceased the practice despite laws authorizing it.155 Indeed,
many states, including Maryland, continue to reauthorize statutory juvenile
150

See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4; NICK MARONEY ET AL.,
MARYLAND JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT, 2016 THIRD QUARTER REPORT 3
(2016)
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/JJM%20Documents/JJMU%20Q3%202016%2
0Report_%20final_Dec%2022.pdf [hereinafter THIRD QUARTER REPORT] (encouraging
the Maryland courts and the Department to work together to limit detention and
commitment for fiscal and efficiency reasons).
151
See THIRD QUARTER REPORT, supra note 150, at 3–4 (encouraging the expansion of
initiatives such as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative because such communitybased interventions positively effect youth outcomes and are more cost-efficient).
152
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (“There are measures of consensus
other than legislation.” (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008)).
153
See id. at 62 (incorporating recent studies of juvenile life without parole sentencing
practices to find that the practice was infrequently implemented).
154
See id. at 62–63 (finding there was a general consensus against the practice, despite
the State’s contention that the studies were not peer-reviewed and incomplete).
155
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (citing SARAH HOCKENBERRY
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2013, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, May 2016, at 6,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/249507.pdf (noting that despite the continued existence of
statutes that permit juvenile pretrial detention, the population of detained delinquents has
decreased thirty-six percent from 1997-2003)).
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pretrial detention schemes.156 Nationwide, the practice of detaining youth
has declined dramatically since 1997, from over 26,000 to just below
17,000 residents.157
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence lends to the
logical conclusion that juvenile pretrial detention violates the right of the
juvenile to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Under the RoperMiller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery line of cases, the Supreme Court
established a firm precedent that “age is more than a chronological fact,”
and that adult penalties and procedures may not apply to children as
harshly.158 To support this conclusion, the Court identified three primary
characteristics of children particularly relevant to treatment within the
criminal justice system.159 First, due to the underdevelopment of the
juvenile brain, children lack maturity and responsibility, causing them to be
more prone to risk-taking and reckless decision-making.160 The structure of
the human brain responsible for executive functioning does not mature until
very late adolescence; therefore, children lack the fully-formed brain
156

See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 152.0015 (2017) (permitting the pretrial detention
of children); ALA. CODE § 12-15-208 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133(b)–(e)
(2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (2017).
157
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2013 6 (2016)
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/249507.pdf) (noting that only 2011 data was available, but
2013 is now the most recent available).
158
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (finding that the diminished
culpability of juveniles, due to their age, cannot rationalize major penological
justifications); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (prohibiting sentences of life
without parole for nonhomicide offenders); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275
(2011) (emphasizing that children are more psychologically vulnerable and thus are
deserving of additional protections in the criminal justice system); Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences without parole for
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct.
718 (2016) (holding that the Miller rule should be applied retroactively).
159
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (establishing the three broad reasons as to why the conduct
of juveniles is not as “morally reprehensible”).
160
Id. at 569; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (relying on amici briefs
to support the contention that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”).
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structure that is responsible for planning, decision-making, and evaluating
risk.161 A child has no influence over his or her brain maturation and thus
cannot be found as liable for his or her transgressions.162 Therefore,
detaining a child prior to adjudication is an excessive sanction for any
alleged offense.163
Second, children are more vulnerable to outside influences and
psychological trauma, rendering them more susceptible to negative pressure
of authority figures and peers.164 This vulnerability, coupled with children’s
lack of institutional independence, also limits children’s abilities to extricate
themselves from “crime-producing” settings, such as abusive homes,
violent neighborhoods, and bullying in schools.165 Given the violent and
unsafe nature of the Maryland detention centers, the vulnerability of
children in Maryland detention centers is of particular concern.166 As the
neuronal development of children is fragile and more susceptible to trauma,
the confinement of a child in unsafe and violent detention center prior to
trial is disproportionately harsh.167
161
See Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 24–28; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778, at *40–43.
162
See id.
163
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (explaining that juveniles have diminished
culpability due, in part, to the underdevelopment of the brain, and thus mandatory
sentencing schemes that do not consider the transient recklessness of youth are
unconstitutional).
164
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982) (recognizing the increased psychological vulnerability of children); cf. J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (ordering the consideration of age into the
Miranda analysis, in part because children are significantly more susceptible to
manipulation and pressure).
165
See Roper at 553, 569–70 (observing a child’s lack of control over his or her lack of
environment, and therefore rendering a juvenile’s conduct less “morally reprehensible”).
166
See THIRD QUARTER REPORT, supra note 150, at 1, 10–13 (describing the lack of
staffing, increase in assaults and fights, and inappropriate use of restraints at Maryland
youth detention centers).
167
See id.; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (discussing how the increased
psychological vulnerability of children can be taken into account during sentencing).
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Third, a child’s character and personality are not well-formed throughout
childhood and adolescence.168 Children struggle to define their identities;
therefore, qualities such as rebelliousness and impulsiveness are often
impermanent and fade with maturation into adulthood.169 Thus, a crime
committed by a child struggling to define his identity cannot be considered
evidence that the child is incorrigible,170 especially when the alleged crime
is a small skirmish, such as Tamika’s case.
Moreover,

the

Roper-Miller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery

line

of

Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence directly seeks to overturn Schall v.
Martin.171 In the early 1980s, juveniles accounted for 17.3 percent of arrests
for violent person and property crimes.172 Justice Rehnquist opined at the
time that the harm to society caused by juvenile crime was greater than that
of adult crime.173 Today, however, children under the age of eighteen
account for just 2 percent of all property offense arrests and 6 percent of all
violent offense arrests.174 Additionally, the Court based its decision in part
on what they saw as adequate conditions of confinement for juveniles in
168
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 570 (2005) (describing how qualities such as recklessness
in youth are often fleeting and impermanent, and thus it is improper to compare the
failings of children with adults).
169
See id. (citing advancements in behavioral science to support the notion that children
struggle to define their identities and thus have unstable self-concepts).
170
See id. (stating that it would be morally indefensible to compare the “failings” of a
child with an adult, as a child’s unstable self-concept renders him less capable of
incorrigibility).
171
See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (emphasizing that
children are significantly more susceptible to manipulation and should be given special
considerations in custody); Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 569–70 (observing a child’s lack of
control over his or her lack of environment, and therefore rendering a juvenile’s conduct
less “morally reprehensible”).
172
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 fn.14 (1984) (citing Department of Justice
statistics in support of the State’s assertion that juvenile crime was a public safety issue).
173
See id. at 265 (explaining that juvenile offenders may harm society worse due to their
increased potential for recidivism).
174
BRIAN A. REAVES, PH.D., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES, 5–6 (Dec. 2013) (providing the most
recent age demographics of defendants committing violent personal and property crimes)
[https://perma.cc/4FC4-K825].
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pretrial detention.175 These conditions included “nonsecure detention,”
without any locked doors, bars, or shackling,; or secure detention, where
children were allowed to wear “street clothes” and partake in educational
and recreational programs.176 Maryland, meanwhile, only provides secure
detention for juveniles in pretrial detention.177 In these secure facilities,
violence, suicidality, and abuse is rampant.178 In certain facilities, on
average, at least one reported assault occurs every three days.179 As children
move through the facilities or are transported elsewhere, such as court or
health appointments, they are routinely strip-searched and shackled.180
These strict policies even apply to children who are detained on low-level
offenses.181 During the day at the facilities, detained children are provided
the bare bones of an educational opportunity, but little else.182 The dated
precedent of Schall does not stand in light of the demands of the RoperMiller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery line of cases, the evolving national
consensus, and the changing statistics.183
175

See Schall, 467 U.S. at 270 (noting that the conditions of confinement for juveniles
reflected the regulatory purposes of New York’s statute).
176
See id. at 271 (describing the conditions of confinement as testified to in the trial).
177
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4–39 (detailing that Maryland
detention centers for juveniles are all maximum-security, or hardware-secure).
178
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1, 18-19, 25-27, 31, 33-35
(reporting the incidences of suicidality, assaults, and staff-on-child abuse that occurred in
detention centers).
179
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 18 (reporting the number of youth
on youth assaults or fights from April 1 to June 30, or 91 days).
180
See Green, supra note 121 (reporting on the excessive use of strip-searching and
shackling of youth in Maryland detention facilities and the psychological trauma inflicted
on youths).
181
See Green, supra note 121, (noting that the strip-searching and shackling policies
apply to every youth, even those who pose little to no risk of flight or a threat).
182
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106; Green, supra note 121, id. at 22–24
(describing the multiple issues with education and activities access, including but not
limited to staffing problems, persistent boredom, youth having insufficient schoolwork,
and a youth earning his diploma but not having access to any higher education).
183
REAVES, supra note 174, at 6, Table 3 (providing the statistics that detail a dramatic
drop from the early 1980s to today in crimes committed by juveniles); see J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (citing the Roper, Miller, Graham line of cases while
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
A. Maryland Must Severely Curtail Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and
Offer Community-Based Services to Juvenile Offenders Awaiting Trial
It is clear that judicial discretion allows for the rampant unnecessary
detention of Maryland juveniles in unsafe facilities.184 The detention of
Maryland juveniles is enormously expensive, as well, costing an average of
$341 per day.185 In order to severely curtail this practice, Maryland must
invest in a two-pronged approach that challenges judicial discretion and
provides effective community services for juveniles awaiting trial.
Maryland should first dramatically expand funding to the Detention
Response Unit of the Maryland Office of the Public Defender (OPD). In
1995, OPD formed the Detention Response Unit in order to respond to the
growing problem of children detained before trial.186 Individual teams,
comprised of a lawyer and a social worker, investigated each claim, found
temporary shelter solutions, and argued to move the child to less restrictive
alternatives.187 The program cost $74 per day on average, yet the unit saved
the state $1,480 per child.188 The holistic, juvenile-focused approach of the
OPD unit, which also received special training and controlled caseloads,
was identified as a highly effective program for indigent juveniles by social
discussing the drastic differences between children and adults, and why children therefore
must be afforded special considerations in the criminal justice system).
184
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1, 18 (reporting the high levels of
suicidality and violence that exists at detention centers); see ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 4–6 (describing how Maryland courts unnecessarily
detain children prior to trial through technical violations).
185
See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2015, supra note 147, at 2, note 50 (reporting the
average cost of confinement of juveniles in Maryland in 2014).
186
EDWARD W. SIEH, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, 315 (1st ed.
2005) (noting that the Detention Response Unit was one of two research-backed OPD
units that addressed specific populations in order to decrease incarceration and increase
positive community outcomes).
187
See id. (describing the respective roles of the social worker and the lawyer team).
188
See N. LEE COOPER ET AL., Fulfilling the Promise of In Re Gault: Advancing the Role
of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 660 n.90 (1998) (lauding the
cost-benefit analysis of the Unit’s Final Progress Report).
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scientists in the 1990s.189 By re-implementing the Detention Response
Team across the state, Maryland will set up a check against trial court
judges who wish to expand the meaning of “necessary to public safety” and
limit commitment to youth who have committed very dangerous crimes.190
Maryland should additionally divest in large youth detention centers and
reinvest in small, community-based programming. In 2013, researchers
from the National Bureau of Economic Research published a study that
found a correlation between youth confinement and a 13.3 percent drop in
the likelihood of graduation from high school, as well as a nearly 25
percent higher adult recidivism rate.191 Multiple jurisdictions have reacted
by implementing pipeline-reduction initiatives, including New York City.192
When New York City implemented the Close to Home initiative, a program
that closed large, upstate facilities and moved youth to small home-like
placements, youth incarceration fell by 55 percent, and youth arrests
declined by half.193 The Close to Home initiative also included a range of
detention

alternatives,

including

short-term

crisis

management,

Multisystemic Therapy, and Functional Family Therapy, resulting in
reduced detention and pre-adjudication arrest rates.194 The State of
189
See id. (imparting the importance of retaining knowledgeable and well-trained juvenile
attorneys representing children so that clients are not inappropriately detained).
190
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017) (allowing the court to
remove a child from a home if in the interest of public safety); PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET
AL., supra note 16, at 18 (discussing how youth confinement and youth offending
declined when states limited the power of judges to detain children to statutorily-defined
offenses).
191
See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2014, supra note 147, at 22, 30 (citing Aizer &
Doyle’s 2013 study on nearly 37,000 youth processed by the Juvenile Court of Cook
County in Chicago to study the impacts of confinement).
192
PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 11, 14, 20, 23 (noting that Texas, New
York City, Massachusetts, and California experienced dramatic reductions in crime and
youth arrests when the jurisdictions implemented initiatives to reduce the amount of
confined youths).
193
See id. at 23 (describing the reform efforts implemented by New York City to
appropriately match child needs while in custody and improve outcomes).
194
See id. (noting that by initiating a new risk-assessment tool and a range of detention
alternatives, New York City likely also reduced youth committed post-adjudication).
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Maryland should implement similar alternatives to pretrial detention, such
as evidence-based, economically-friendly programs like the Adolescent
Diversion Project, mentoring programs, Multisystemic Therapy, Functional
Family Therapy, and Communities that Care.195 These programs can cost as
little as $75 per day while achieving better outcomes.196 The Annie E.
Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiatives, a similar
program, was established in Baltimore City in 2012. The program has
already experienced success in limiting the number of juveniles committed
post-adjudication.197 The Attorney General of Maryland has declared
support for these initiatives and urges the State and the Department of
Juvenile Services to take further action for the benefit of the children and
taxpayers alike.198

V. CONCLUSION
Under the Juvenile Causes Act, a child who is alleged delinquent should
not be separated from his or her family unless the welfare of the child or
public safety is threatened.199 If the child is detained in the custody of the
State, the Department of Juvenile Services must provide a safe, humane,

195

See id. at 10-13 (presenting various evidence-based, research-based, and promising
practices for children in the juvenile justice system, including the excellent cost-benefit
analysis on each).
196
See PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16 at 21 (noting that community-based
services for youth are a “win-win” in that they provide more effective programs at a
lower cost).
197
See RICHARD E. MENDEL, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE
PROGRESS REPORT 2014, 14–16 (2014) http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf2014JDAIProgressReport-2014.pdf#page=18 (reporting that although Baltimore City
experienced a 43 percent drop in commitments, the average daily population in facilities
rose by seven percent) [https://perma.cc/EE4L-SBVP].
198
See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 2, 43 (adopting the position that
juvenile detention and incarceration is extremely costly while providing no additional
benefit for public safety or outcomes for children).
199
See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017) (stating the importance of
strengthening and preserving the family unit).
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and caring environment.200 Maryland’s current practice of inappropriately
detaining juveniles prior to adjudication violates the stated purposes of the
Juvenile Causes Act for children alleged delinquent.201 Maryland’s courts
unnecessarily detain its youth and subsequently detain them in abhorrent
conditions that provide neither a safe nor comfortable environment.202
Moreover, this practice is contrary to Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence
under Constitutional Law.203 By unnecessarily detaining children prior to
trial in unsuitable conditions, Maryland violates the Eighth Amendment and
denies juveniles the special protections afforded to children in the criminal
justice system.204 In order to mitigate this crisis, Maryland must invest in
initiatives to drastically curtail the population of children in detention.205

200
See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)–(7) (emphasizing the importance of securing for a child a
similar environment to that which should have been provided by his parents).
201
Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2002), with SECOND
QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–40 (reporting and investigating the high
incidences of assault, uses of physical restraint and shackling, and suicidal behavior in
Maryland
202
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73 at 4 (noting that the most common
reason for juvenile confinement in Maryland is technical violations of court orders);
SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 19, 22 (noting the inappropriate usage of
seclusion and shackling).
203
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261
(2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115 (1982) (stressing the differences penological goals for children and adults).
204
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (finding that the young age of juveniles affords them
special protections because “youth is more than a chronological fact”).
205
See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2014, supra note 147, at 38; PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET
AL., supra note 16, at 21–23 (recommending community-based programs, probation
reforms, targeted public defender strategies, and prosocial development to reduce
detention and commitment at a lower cost while reducing crime).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

